Minor update.
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2 changed files with 8 additions and 4 deletions
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@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ REFER_OPTS ?= -PS -e -p $(BIBLIOGRAPHY)
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REFER = refer $(REFER_OPTS)
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# -k => iconv conversion (did it ever worked?)
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# -t => tbl preprocessor
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# -ms => ms macro
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# -U => unsafe (because of PDF inclusion)
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# -Tpdf => output device is PDF
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@ -1132,12 +1132,12 @@ For example, several applications with networking features might run on a comput
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If one of these applications is successfully attacked, the attacker shouldn't be able to access other services data or user data.
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Same thing for shared computers, one user shouldn't be able to see other users' data.
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Therefore, the most widespread form of security comes from filesystem permissions, enabling a user (or a group of users) to access (or to be denied from accessing) specific data (files and directories).
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Those permissions include the right to read, to modify or to execute a file, to list or to remove files from a directory, to create or remove directories and a few other permissions.
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Those permissions include the right to read, to modify or to execute a file, to list or to remove files from a directory, to create or to remove directories and a few other permissions.
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Extended permissions and attributes exist but are out-of-scope.
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Beside permissions, encryption also brings some kind of security.
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In this case, the point is to prevent attackers from accessing protected data despite retrieving files.
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Some advanced filesystems can encrypt file individually, others provide the encryption of a whole partition, both methods having their pros and cons.
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Some advanced filesystems can encrypt files individually, others provide the encryption of a whole partition, both methods having their pros and cons.
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.BULLET
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.KS
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@ -1147,10 +1147,13 @@ While storage devices mostly impose physical limitations, a filesystem may be wa
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.KE
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Depending on the scenario, the filesystem might become wasteful or slow.
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Some filesystems cannot handle a huge number of small files (from hundreds of millions to billions) without wasting a lot of space, such as ext4 which doesn't have block suballocation: once a file and has at least one byte in it, it takes a 4kB block size and 4k-1 bytes are wasted.
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Some filesystems cannot handle a huge number of small files (from hundreds of millions to billions) without wasting a lot of space, such as ext4 which doesn't have block suballocation: once a file and has at least one byte in it, it takes a 4kB block size and 4kB-1 bytes are wasted.
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So, worst case scenario, data rate is
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.FRAC 1 4000
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(huge waste) meaning that a 1GB of data would require an entire 4TB hard drive (without even taking the inodes' size into account).
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(huge waste) meaning that a 1GB of data would require an entire 4TB hard drive\*[*] (without even taking the inodes' size into account).
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.FOOTNOTE1
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Ext4 can integrate up to 60 bytes of data into an extended inode.
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.FOOTNOTE2
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.BULLET
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.KS
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